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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA FIFE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

:

Case No.

20452

NORMAN FIFE,

:

Case Priority 13.b.

Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dividing
the marital property of the parties?
II
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding
permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Barbara Fife filed this action for divorce on October
4, 1983, (R.2), after having been married to Norman Fife
since November 27, 1957, (R.356).

At the trial held on July

31, 1984, the parties stipulated Mrs. Fife would be awarded
the custody of the only minor child remaining at home (R.256)
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but the issues of child support, alimony and property
division were to be decided by the judge presiding, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
After listening to the evidence, Judge Frederick ruled
from the bench concerning the issues before the Court. Mrs.
Fife's counsel then prepared proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce and submitted
copies thereof to Mr. Fife's counsel on or about August 28,
1984 (R.125).

Mrs. Fife's counsel contacted Mr. Fife's

counsel on or about September 15, 1984, concerning the
foregoing pleadings and was advised specific objections or
amended documents would be immediately forthcoming (R.125).
No objections or proposed amended documents were submitted by
Mr. Fife's counsel (R.125).

Mrs. Fife's counsel mailed an

Affidavit to Mr. Fife's counsel on October 5, 1984, regarding
her attempts to finalize the pleadings (R.126).

On October

9, 1984, the Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce (R.127-141).
On October 15, 1984, Mr. Fife's counsel filed
objections to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree already
entered by the Court (R.142).

On November 8, 1984, a hearing

was held on those objections and the Court ordered the
parties' counsel to confer to resolve the issues raised by
the objections (R.164).

On December 28, 1984, the Court
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entered Second Amended Findings, Conclusions and Decree
(R.168-183).

Mr. Fife filed his notice of appeal on January

28, 1985 (R.187) after trial counsel for both parties had
withdrawn (R.184,185).
On March 28, 1985, the Supreme Court ordered the case
be remanded (R.227) apparently for consideration of Mr.
Fife's Rule 60(b) Motion dated March 22, 1985 (R.225).

A

hearing on that Motion was scheduled for April 22, 1985,
(R.245) but was continued, ex parte, without date by Mr.
Fife's second counsel (R.250).

In the interim, judgment for

several matters set forth in the Decree was obtained in a
hearing on March 25, 1985 (R.247,248).

On January 30, 1986,

Mr. Fife's second counsel withdrew (See Court's file) and Mr.
Fife's present counsel appeared as a matter of record on
March 27, 1986.

A hearing was held on May 19, 1986,

concerning the Rule 60(b) Motion and the Motion was denied.
No appeal of denial of that Motion has been pursued.
At the time of trial, Barbara Fife was forty-eight (48)
years old (R.356) and the mother of four children by her
marriage to Norman Fife (R.357).

Mrs. Fife is a high school

graduate (R.360) and attended college at Brigham Young
University from 1953 through 1955 but did not obtain a degree
(R.361).

From the inception of the parties' marriage through

1977, Mrs. Fife's primary occupation was that of wife, mother
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and homemaker (R.361).

The parties did discuss the

possibility of Mrs. Fife seeking employment but Mr. Fife did
not want her to work outside the home and asserted "If you
want to earn the living, then I will stay home with the
kids."(R.361).
In 1977, Mrs. Fife began working for K-Mart on a parttime basis (R.360) and continued working on such a basis
until she filed for divorce when she commenced working fulltime (R.360).

Mrs. Fife was earning $5.60 per hour (R.358),

had a net monthly income of $650.00 per month (R.358) and
monthly expenses of approximately $1,000.00 (R.373) at the
time of trial.
During the parties' marriage, Mr. Fife began a sole
proprietorship under the name of FIFECO (R.291) in which he
sought and obtained government contracts (R.393).

Mr. Fife

testified he would consider himself to be "the business of
FIFECO" (R.435) and that FIFECO "kept no form of books,..."
(R.417).

Mr. Fife paid both personal and business expenses

from the FIFECO business checking account (R.417).

Mr. Fife

further admitted his gross income was in the sum of
$200,000.00 per year (R.288) and that he had received at
least in $190,000.00 in government contracts for the eleven
(11) months prior to trial (R.292).
In addition to, and in clarification of, the dollar
4

figures referred to in Mr. Fife's Brief and Addendum I, the
trial court did not accept Mr. Fife's testimony concerning
the value of the promissory notes awarded to him.

The Court

heard Mr. Fife testify that he had not made any efforts to
collect the promissory notes (R.276-278) and Mr. Fife did not
present any evidence concerning the amount of indebtedness
that was due and owing on the Park City Condominium awarded
to him.

Mr. Fife's version of the facts and his Addendum I

also do not reflect the Court's award to him of his
$205,000.00 interest in the Ranch in Salmon, Idaho (R.175)
nor the award of his $21,250.00 interest in the Stringham
Avenue property (R.176).

Accordingly, Mrs. Fife submits that

Addendum A submitted herewith more accurately discloses the
true distribution of the trial court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
dividing the property and assessing the debts.

Mr. Fife has

an admitted better ability to pay the marital debts and has
over $446,584.00 in assets available to him (See Addendum A ) .
When the record is reviewed to determine the evidence
presented to the trial court, Mr. Fife received a net award
of property totaling over $380,000.00 and Mrs. Fife's award
of $203,000.00 pales in comparison.

More simply put—Mr.

Fife is attempting to mathematically manipulate the figures
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of the trial court to show inequality.

The record discloses,

however, that Mr. Fife was not only treated equally, but more
importantly, he was treated equitably by the lower court.
The evidence presented to the lower court fully
supports the award of permanent alimony of $400.00 per month.
Mr. Fife has the capacity of earning $200,000.00 yearly and
has complete control of FIFECO.

During the parties1

marriage, they acquired substantial assets and traveled
extensively.

Moreover, Mrs. Fife was requested to remain at

home with the parties1 minor children and was not, at the
time of trial, capable of obtaining sufficient employment to
maintain the lifestyle she had become accustomed to during
twenty-six years of marriage.

Furthermore, Mrs. Fife's lack

of work experience, substantial lack of education and
advanced age make it improbable she will be able to achieve
her married lifestyle again and the alimony award is
justified on the facts of this case and the case law in Utah.
Mrs. Fife, therefore, seeks a determination from this
Court that the lower court's Decree of Divorce is appropriate
in all respects and affirmance of the same. Further, Mrs.
Fife respectfully asks this Court to award her a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs incurred in connection with this
appeal.
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I
A TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DIVISION SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED SINCE IT IS CLOTHED WITH A PRESUMPTION
OF VALIDITY AND MR. FIFE HAS FAILED TO
DEMONSTRATE A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The standard for review of property divisions in a
divorce case has been succinctly stated by this Court:
"In reviewing the property division made by the trial
court, this Court endows its decision with a presumption of
validity and does not disturb the decree absent a clear abuse
of discretion or a manifest injustice or inequity." Stephens
v. Stephens, 45 Utah Adv. Rep. 14(1986) citing Pusey v.
Pusey, 40 Utah Adv. Rep. 3(1986); Claus v. Claus, 39 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22(1986).
The principal contention of Mr. Fife in this appeal is
that the trial court's order requiring him to pay most of the
parties1 marital debts mandates that he should be awarded a
greater portion of the parties assets.

Specifically, Mr.

Fife requests this Court to award him $112,768.00 of the
parties marital assets in addition to the $220,334.00 already
awarded by the lower court.

Mr. Fife argues that because he

has the better ability to pay marital debts and a much
greater income ($85,000.00 per year as compared to Mrs.
Fife's annual income of approximately $10,000.00) then the
trial court should have awarded him a total of $333,102.00 of
the marital assets.

Thus, Mr. Fife asserts that an

"equitable" division of the marital estate is for the court
to award him 78% of the marital estate, together with 100% of
his $226,250.00 inherited property, as "compensation" for the
7

his $226,250.00 inherited property, as "compensation" for the
requirement that he assume the parties1 marital debts.
In addition to the clear inequity and manifest
injustice that is sought by Mr. Fife's proposed property
distribution, Mr. Fife's argument is flawed in many respects.
First, Mr. Fife appears to assert that the property and debt
division must be equal. This argument is not supported by
Utah case law which has consistently held that an equitable
distribution is the standard for a property distribution and
mathematical equality is not required.

Sinclair v. Sinclair,

718 P.2d 396(Utah 1986); Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106(Utah
1986); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
In the present case, Mr. Fife admits he was awarded 52%
of the parties' marital assets. He also does not challenge
the lower court's finding that his average net income is in
the range of $85,000.00. His annual income is therefore over
eight times that of Mrs. Fife and he candidly admits this
Court, in Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980), has
stated the ability to pay marital debts is a relevant factor
in distributing assets and debts. Mr. Fife suggests,
however, that this Court should divide the marital debts on
the same percentages as the assets despite this gross
disparity in income. With this argument, Mrs. Fife strongly
disagrees.
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Mr. Fife has $446,584.00 in assets, both marital assets
and assets from his inheritance, awarded to him by the trial
court (see Addendum A ) .

He has a tremendous annual income

and has the ability to reduce the parties1 marital debts in a
short time period.

In contrast, Mrs. Fife cannot meet her

monthly expenses of $1,000.00 on a net monthly income of
$650.00.

To award Mrs. Fife only $92,834.00 of the marital

assets so that Mr. Fife can be treated "equally" on marital
debts would be a true miscarriage of justice.

Further, under

his proposed distribution, Mr. Fife would leave the marriage
with over $559,352.00 in assets, including his inheritance.
This Court should not, in good conscience, sanction the
abandonment of Mrs. Fife by allowing Mr. Fife to exit a
marriage after twenty six years with virtually all of the
accumulated assets.
An even more important reason that the trial court's
award should be affirmed is that Mr. Fife's claims on two
"debts" are not supported by the record below.

Specifically,

mr. Fife asserts the promissory notes with face values of
$73,160.00 are worthless.

Mr. Fife's argument ignores,

however, his candid admission that he had not pursued any
collection efforts on those notes (R.276-278).

Furthermore,

both of the promissory notes are secured by trust deeds on
real property (R.276-278).

In view of his own admissions,
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the trial court apparently chose not to believe Mr. Fife's
bald, uncorroborated assertion that the notes were worthless.
This court should not overturn the trial judge's assessment
of Mr. Fife's credability on this issue.
Mr. Fife also asserts there exists a $131,023.00
obligation on the Park City Condo awarded to him.

The

record, however, does not disclose any evidence presented by
Mr. Fife on the amount of the debt and the trial court made
no finding as to the amount of that encumbrance. Moreover,
Mr. Fife should not now be permitted to complain about the
inadequacy of this finding because it resulted from his own
failure to present evidence on the issues and no objection to
that particular finding was raised by trial counsel in her
extensive objections to the final pleadings submitted to the
court (R.142-145 and 159-161).
The trial court's property distribution and debt
assessment, although not mathematically equal, is more than
equitable in view of the disparate earning capacities of the
parties and the more than double amount of assets available
to Mr. Fife. The trial court's decision should be affirmed.
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II
MR. FIFE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE TRIAL
COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND THE AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
For Mr. Fife to prevail on this appeal concerning the
award of alimony, he must show a "clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion," Claus v. Claus, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 39,40(Utah
1986) (citing Higly v. Higly, 676 P.2d 379(1983)) and the
burden is on Mr. Fife "to show that the evidence does not
support the findings."

Claus, at 40 (citing Graff v. Graff,

699 P.2d 765(Utah 1985) .
The case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072(1986),
contrary to Mr. Fife's Brief, is very analogous to the
present facts.

In Jones, the wife was awarded no income

producing assets, was married at a relatively young age, she
had devoted most of the parties twenty-nine (29) years of
marriage to raising the parties' children and had no
professional training or marketable skills.

In the case at

bar, Mrs. Fife was awarded some income producing assets in
the form of stock but the remaining income producing assets
(namely, FIFECO, the trust deed notes and the Park City
Condo) were awarded to Mr. Fife.

The parties married when

Mrs. Fife was twenty-one (21) years old and she testified she
devoted most of her twenty-seven (27) years of marriage to
being a wife and homemaker.

Moreover, Mrs. Fife does not
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have any marketable skills and, given her age, is probably
relegated to working in unskilled positions like the one she
currently holds.
Furthermore, when viewing the evidence on each of the
factors set forth in Jones, the award is justified. Mrs.
Fife clearly has financial need for support as evidenced by
the shortfall between her income of $650.00 and her monthly
expenses of $1,000.00. Additionally, the parties became
accustomed to a very comfortable lifestyle due to the success
of FIFECO resulting in substantial assets and much vacation
traveling.
As to the second factor in Jones, Mrs. Fife does not
have the ability to provide support for herself due to her
insufficient training, lack of education and age thereby
preventing her from having any reasonable expectation of
obtaining employment that will enable her to support herself
at a standard of living even approaching that she had during
their marriage.
Finally, Mr. Fife's annual income of $85,000.00 clearly
supports a determination that he has the ability to pay
alimony.

Mr. Fife has not challenged the lower court's

finding or this issue.
Mr. Fife asserts that because the trial court awarded
alimony in an amount more•than that prayed for in the
12

complaint, there must be some error.

Mr. Fife ignores,

however, the fact that Mrs. Fife alleged no knowledge of the
extent of marital assets in her complaint at paragraph 13
(R.4).

Mrs. Fife, nor her counsel, did not, therefore, have

the ability to determine what would be an appropriate request
for alimony at the time of filing of the complaint.

The

trial court, however, had full benefit of the discovery and
investigation done by Mrs. Fife's counsel that brought to
light many non-disclosures on his part.

Such an award is

therefore appropriate.
Mr. Fife alleges he is being punished by the lower
court's alimony award.

Irrespective of the trial court's

interpretation of Mr. Fife's actions, the foregoing analysis
demonstrates Mrs. Fife is entitled to permanent alimony.
Furthermore, that specific findings were not made on each
factor is not fatal to the lower court's analysis inasmuch as
the trial judge did not have the benefit of the Jones
decision and the record, as shown herein, clearly supports an
award under the Jones analysis (see Olson v. Olson, 15 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8 (1986)).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision is supported by both the
facts presented at trial and the case law in Utah.

The lower

court's decision should be affirmed and Mrs. Fife should be
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awarded her reasonable attorney's fee and costs incurred in
connection with this appeal.

DATED this

:J(j

day of November, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,

E. "Norde/Il Weeks
Phillip W. Dyer
Attorneys for Respondent

Erfife.bri
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ADDENDUM "A"

Awarded to Mrs. Fife
Value of
Assets

Assets
Home 2410 Evergreen

$130,000
12,500
12,550

Furniture
Mercedes
Granada
Stock
Snowbird Condominium

Debt Against
Assets
$

-0-0-0-0-

1,843
28,809
7,000

Antique Dolls

3,000

Train Set
Cash

1,500

894
-0-0-0-

8,400

TOTAL TO MRS. FIFE:

$205,602

32

$

1,726

Awarded to Mr. Fife
GMC Truck
Thunderbird
Ford Pickup
Audi

$

2,610

675
675
65

Boat
Camper

1,200

Inventory and Equipment
Life Insurance Policy
Limited Partnership

2,644

Park City Condominium
Trust Deeds

550
988
30,767
107,000
73,160

$

-0-

-0-0-0-0-017,011

-043,856

-0-0-

SUBTOTAL:

$446,584

$ 60,867

Salmon Ranch

205,000
21,250
$446,584

-0-0-

Stringham Avenue
TOTAL TO MR. FIFE

$ fin.Rfi?
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